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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1999, Frank Sander, a pre-eminent ADR scholar, was asked to
evaluate the state of ADR.1 His answer was that while "we've made
amazing progress," we still "have a way to go." 2 One of his greatest
concerns was about the long-term professional issues of ADR and
mediation in particular. While there was an ample supply of people
trained in mediation in 1999, there was not enough paying work for
them. 3
Training courses were plentiful, but there were few
mentoring and other job opportunities. Most people interested in
mediation were advised to pursue their interest on a part-time or
volunteer basis at night and over weekends, while keeping their day
jobs.

4

To this day, making mediation a full-time career remains
extremely difficult. Professor Eric Green, a law professor at Boston
University and a successful commercial mediator, noted in a class
lecture that there is "no career path in mediation." 5 For virtually
all successful private mediators, mediation is a second or third
6
career; most are in their fifties or older.
* Teaching Fellow, Harvard University, Department of Economics. J.D., 2009, Harvard
Law School; LL.M., 2003, Harvard Law School; LL.B., 2002, University of Ljubljana,
Slovenia. I would like to thank my mentor David Hoffman and Robert A. Creo for helpful
advice and invaluable insights.
1 See Frank E.A. Sander, The Future of ADR, 2000 J. DISp. RESOL. 3 (2000). Professor
Sander delivered the lecture at the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law on April
16, 1999.
2 Id.
3 Id. at 8.
4 Id.
5 Eric D. Green, Lecture at Harvard Law School Mediation Class (Mar. 13, 2008).
6 See, e.g., Stephen B. Goldberg, The Secrets of Successful Mediators, 21 NEGOTIATION J.
365, 366 (2005). The author surveyed successful mediators, most of whom have mediated at
least 100 cases. Eighty percent of mediators in his final sample of thirty were over the age of
fifty and fifty percent were over sixty years old. See also PETER LOVENHEIM, BECOMING A
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More interestingly, of those who decide to become mediators,
eighty percent cannot make a living solely as mediators. 7 Aspiring
mediators are constantly scrambling for work, but often must
return to their old careers. 8 Fifteen percent "[keep] busy, make a
[decent] living, but never quite break through."9 The top five
percent, however, are booked months in advance and can gross
upwards of a million dollars per year.1 0 This presents efficiency
concerns regarding wasted resources on excess market entry and on
mediation education, and distributional concerns regarding
mediator income inequality. 1
In this article, I explore the market for mediators, in particular
for mediators in private practice. 12
1 argue that the private
mediator market is similar to markets for entertainers or
professional athletes, instead of the professional job markets from
where many mediators are drawn; a few mediators at the top of the
pyramid are wealthy, while the vast majority of mediators make
little or no money. I explore possible economic explanations for why
the market for mediators is a "winner-take-all market."
Since mediation is not a licensed profession, there is little reliable
data on how many Americans work as mediators, in what practice
areas, and how much they earn, and even less empirical research.
The data in this article is drawn from public sources-Bureau of
Labor Statistics, American Bar Association, Association for Conflict
Resolution, and court mediator rosters-and from surveys and
interviews conducted with ten successful mediators and dispute

MEDIATOR: AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO EXPLORING CAREERS IN MEDIATION 54, 70-71 (2002)

(noting that the median age of volunteer mediators in community mediation centers is fortysix, that seventy percent of divorce and family mediators in private practice are between forty
and fifty-nine years old).
7 See JEFFREY KRIvIS & NAOMI LUCKS, HOW TO MAKE MONEY AS A MEDIATOR (AND CREATE
VALUE FOR EVERYONE): 30 TOP MEDIATORS SHARE SECRETS TO BUILDING A SUCCESSFUL

PRACTICE 9 (2006).
s Id. at 9-10.
9 Id. at 10.
10 Id. at 10, 137.
11 If we believe that mediation is a skill improved over time or with frequent practice, then
the large number of part-time mediators also raises concerns about the quality of mediation
provided. In one of the few empirical studies ever performed, Roselle Wissler found training
had no impact on settlement, but that experienced mediators were more likely to bring the
case to settlement. Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases:
What We Know from Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 641, 678-79 (2002).

Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes found that parties preferred mediators with experience.
See Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation Research Results, in DIVORCE
MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 429, 436 (1988).
12 There is no single market for mediators. See discussion infra Part IIA-B.
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resolution scholars in private practice. 13 The interviews were
conducted either by telephone or by e-mail in March and April 2008.
Because of limited data, the article does not provide complete
empirical answers, but rather asks questions to be explored further
in the future.
II. THE MARKET FOR MEDIATION SERVICES AND FOR MEDIATION
PROVIDERS

The market for mediation has significantly grown and matured
over the last thirty years. Data about the market for mediation
services and for mediation providers suggests that supply exceeds
demand. More mediators want to enter the market than there are
mediation jobs. This section presents data on the two different
markets and on the different types of job opportunities for
mediators.
A. Mediation Services
There is not one single market for mediation services in the
United States. Markets differ jurisdictionally-i.e., markets in
states where courts can and frequently order the parties to mediate
and those states where courts do not have that authority differ
markedly-and based on type of mediation-i.e., community
mediation, which evolved outside the courts, and private mediation,
including domestic, small claims, and commercial mediation, which
is often either court-mandated or conducted in the shadow of
litigation. 14
Mediation is a common form of resolving disputes in many
communities. Tribal communities have been using mediation for
centuries, 15 and in China, the People's Mediation Committees

13 1 would like to thank the mediators who responded to my query: Tracy Allen, William
Baten, Robert Benjamin, John Bickerman, Steve Cerveris, Robert A. Creo, Eric Galton, Susan
Hammer, John Lande, and John Van Winkle.
14 Markets could also be divided geographically and into more categories based on type of
mediation offered. In particular, domestic mediators and labor mediators tend to specialize,
and the particulars of those markets differ from the market for commercial mediation. For
example, fees for labor mediation are regulated and a smaller percentage of domestic and
labor mediators are lawyers than is the case for commercial mediators. But, in the
characteristic I analyze in this article, namely mediator income distribution, these markets
are relatively similar. While income disparities might be smaller, they are still present, and
both markets are as difficult to enter as the commercial mediation market. See discussion
infra Part IV.C.2-D.

11 See generally DAVID LEVINSON, AGGRESSION AND

CONFLICT: A CROSS-CULTURAL
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resolve over seven million disputes annually.1 6 In communities
where mediation is commonly used to settle disputes, senior or
1 7
influential members of the community act as intermediaries.
Mediation is only one of their functions and they could by no means
be called professional mediators.
The United States, on the other hand, has relied on an
adversarial system of judicial dispute resolution, where each side
presents its case and a jury decides the winner. As the number of
court filings increased in the 1950s through the 1970s, federal and
state courts began developing programs parallel to the court system,
called dispute resolution programs, to deal with the flood of cases.18
Frank Sander proposed the concept of the multi-door courthouse,
where an aggrieved party could go to court and an attendant at the
door would direct her to one of the many doors, each providing a
different alternative for resolving her problem. 19 In the states that
embraced the multi-door courthouse concept and granted judges
authority to order parties to mediate (or made pre-litigation
mediation mandatory), mediation has grown tremendously,
including domestic mediation, small claims mediation, and high-end
commercial mediation. 20 "Mediation generally has not developed as
''2 1
quickly or as pervasively in the other states.
Mediation remains a choice that is more often than not the result
of a judicial or legislative mandate than of party choice. According
to a survey by the American Arbitration Association, 63% of
respondents (i.e., companies) and 73% percent of Fortune companies
attributed their use of mediation to court-mandated mediation

ENCYCLOPEDIA 113-14 (1994) (discussing the importance of mediation in small, tight-knit
communities).
16

KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 25-26 (2d ed. 2000)

(explaining how Confucian traditions helped shape the current practice).
17 See LEVINSON, supra note 15, at 114.

18 See Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Movement is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 165, 174-78 (2003).
19 See Frank E.A. Sander, Professor of Law at Harvard Univ., Varieties of Dispute
Processing, Address Delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (Apr. 7-9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 111, 131
(1976) (describing the concept of the multi-door courthouse).
20 See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND

OTHER PROCESSES 603 (5th ed. 2007) (noting that there is a marked difference between states
where courts rules or legislation made mediation mandatory and those where they did not).
21 E-mail from John Van Winkle, Mediator, to author (Oct. 7, 2008, 14:14:11 EST) (on file
with author). John Lande reports that there is greater support in the business community for
the use of mediation in states with strong ADR cultures, such as Florida, than in states with
See John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices
weak ADR cultures.
Transform Each Other?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839, 841 n.8 (1997).

2009]

Making Peace and Making Money

programs. 22 There are important differences between the states
with court-mandated mediation and those without, such as in the
number of mediators in private practice (many more in mandatory
jurisdictions), in the types of cases they mediate (less variety in nonmandatory jurisdictions), and in who the mediators are, but there
are also important similarities that justify analyzing the market for
private mediators as a single one. Making a living as a mediator in
private practice is difficult in both types of jurisdictions, and the
income distribution of mediators in private practice as well as the
reasons for the steep income distributions are similar.
In addition, and detached from the legal system, mediation was a
part of the community empowerment movement in the late 1960s
and 1970s. 2 3 Community justice centers were established to resolve
neighborhood disputes. 24 These centers grew from the need to
escape the institutionalization of justice and to "get away from
lawyers, judges, courthouses and... a justice system" that has
become too burdensome and costly for the average citizen. 25 The
goal of community mediation centers was to train volunteers to
mediate, not to pay them. 26 As a result, volunteer mediation
markets and volunteer mediators are not the subject matter of this
analysis.
Furthermore, as the private mediation market matures,
Although general
mediators are increasingly specializing.
practitioners still exist, many mediators today specialize in divorce,
public policy disputes (e.g., environmental) or commercial
mediation. These markets are distinct and successful mediators in
one market find it increasingly difficult to branch out into another
market, regardless of their skills and reputation in their primary
27
market.
Although the market for mediation services has grown, it is still

22

See AM.

ARBITRATION ASS'N,

DISPUTE-WISE

BUSINESS

MANAGEMENT:

IMPROVING

ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC OUTCOMES IN MANAGING BUSINESS CONFLICTS 19 tbl.11, 28

tbl.20 (2006), availableat http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4124.
23 See Hensler, supra note 18, at 170.
24

See EVAN R. SEAMONE, BRINGING A SMILE TO MEDIATION'S Two FACES: How ASPIRING

MEDIATORS MIGHT JUMP-START CAREERS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING LAw SCHOOL, § II.B.,

5-6 (2000), http://www.uiowa.edu/-cyberlaw/elpOO/Evan/mediation/.
25 Peter S. Adler, Lawyer and Non-Lawyer Mediation: Speculations on Brewing
Controversy, NIDR Forum, June 1997, at 47.
7.
26 See SEAMONE, supra note 24, at § II.B.,
27 See Christopher Honeyman et al., Skill Is Not Enough: Seeking Connectedness and
Authority in Mediation, 20 NEGOTIATION J. 489, 503-04 (2004).
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relatively small compared to litigation. 28 The usual explanation is a
lack of knowledge (on the part of the public) regarding mediation. 29
Other explanations include the principal-agent problem of lawyers
as gatekeepers to mediation, who avoid mediation because they
want to maintain control over the dispute and because they have a
financial interest in channeling and prolonging it.30 Finally, it has
been suggested that the mediation market remains small because
using mediation, unless court-mandated, requires consent of both
parties. Without consent, the default option, litigation, will be
used.31

B. MediationProviders
Like there is no single market in mediation services, there is also
not a single market for mediation providers.
The mediation
profession, as it has evolved in the United States, ranges from
mediators who volunteer in community mediation centers and take
on a couple neighborhood disputes each year, to mediators in
private practice who mediate complex business cases full-time and
can gross over $1 million per year. 32
The profession is unstructured and large because there are "few
formal barriers to entry,"33 because it is perceived as very
emotionally rewarding, 34 and because of entrant over-optimism that
mediation is a viable career option.
Unlike law, psychology,
architecture, medicine, or social work, "mediators in private practice
are not licensed or regulated by states."35 Most mediators are
required or choose to complete only a thirty-to-forty-hour training

28 See Maurits Barendrecht & Berend R. de Vries, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss with
Sticky Defaults: Failure in the Market for Dispute Resolution Services?, 7 CARDOZO J.

CONFLICT RESOL. 83, 90 (2005).
29

Id. at 92.

30 See Sander, supra note 1, at 6.

See Barendrecht & de Vries, supra note 28, at 85.
LOVENHEIM, supra note 6, at 160.
33 While there are very few formal barriers to entry, many practitioners in the field have
noted that there are significant barriers to practice commercial mediation for women, ethnic
and racial minorities, and non-lawyers.
See Christopher Honeyman et al., New York
31
32

Moveable Feast: Boundaries to Practice,2 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 147, 147-48, 150-51

(2004).
34 One mediator I interviewed said it was a privilege to be able to help people resolve
disputes.
35 Diane Levin, Mediation Certification and Credentialing: Getting Accurate Information
on
Becoming
a
Mediator,
MEDIATION
CHANNEL,
http://mediationchannel.com/2007/01/21/mediation-certification-and-credentialing-gettingaccurate-information-on-becoming-a-mediator (last visited Sept. 22, 2008).
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course. 36 Mediation is also seen "as 'fun,' as opposed to the
drudgery of much of law practice." 37 As a result, there are a lot
more mediators than there are mediation jobs. 38 One mediator
observed that as the mediation business doubles, the number of
39
people wanting to be mediators quadruples.
Mediators hail from a variety of backgrounds: social work, human
resources, psychology, labor relations, business, accounting, and
religion. 40
Mental health practitioners commonly serve as
mediators in family disputes, human resources specialists
commonly serve as in-house mediators for employment disputes,
and diplomats commonly serve as mediators in international
disputes. 4 1
But, lawyers dominate the mediation market, in
particular for cases that are litigated or about to be litigated,
42
including domestic and commercial disputes.
Experienced practitioners estimate that more than 100,000 people
have received some sort of mediation training, including training in
community mediation centers, but not counting peer and school
programs, including at the university and college levels. 43 Of those
trained, relatively few actually practice mediation and even fewer
make a living as full-time mediators. Sometimes, mediating parttime is a choice: some attorneys offer dispute resolution services in
addition to their legal services; some therapists mediate in addition
to counseling families and couples.
But, for the most part,
mediators mediate part-time because they cannot support
36 Marty Nemko, Mediator: Executive Summary, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 19,
2007, available at http://www.usnews.com/articles/business/best-careers/2007/12/19/mediatorexecutive-summary.html.
37 Christopher Honeyman et al., Washington, D.C. Moveable Feast: The Odds on
Leviathan-Dispute Resolution and Washington, D.C.'s Culture, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 159, 165 (2004).
38 Nemko, supra note 36.
39 KRIVIS & LUCKS, supra note 7, at 12 (observation by Robert A. Creo).
40 See LOVENHEIM, supra note 6, at 52 tbl.3.1.
41 Telephone Interview with Prof. John Lande, Univ. of Mo.-Columbia Sch. of Law (Mar.
28, 2008).
42 Mediation practitioners estimate that 90 to 95% of commercial mediators are lawyers.
43 Since only Virginia, Texas, New Hampshire and Florida certify mediators, there is little
available data on the number of mediators that have been trained and the number that
practice. I would like to thank Robert A. Creo for the estimate. E-mail from Robert A. Creo,
Mediator, to author (Apr. 6, 2008, 14:56:10 EST) (on file with author). The United States
Postal Service offers its employees a voluntary alternative dispute resolution program, called
REDRESS, as part of the Postal Service's Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint
process. United States Postal Service, REDRESS, http://www.usps.com/redress/ (last visited
Sept. 22, 2008). A number of people have received mediation training through the program
and over 1,500 mediators are currently on the REDRESS roster. United States Postal
Service, Mediators, http://www.usps.com/redress/mediators.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2008).
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themselves solely with mediation. 44
The vast majority of people who enter the mediation market drop
out within two years. 45 Of those who persist, about 8,500 earn
$56,000 or more per year from mediation. 46 Many of those are
employed in salaried positions either with state or local
governments, the courts, or with private organizations, including
labor organizations, insurance carriers, law firms, or private
47
companies.
C. Where Do Mediators Work?
By and large, mediators practice in five types of workplaces:
community mediation centers; government programs; corporate,
association, and specialty programs; court-connected programs; and
private practice, including private dispute resolution companies
Mediators in community mediation centers usually
(panels).48
Mediators working for the
provide their services for free.
government, corporations and other associations are often salaried,
while most court-connected programs and private mediation
services are offered by mediators in private practice as independent
contractors. As the latter are the focus of this article, the analysis of
their work environment is more detailed than for volunteer and
salaried mediators.
1. Volunteer Mediators
In 2006, twenty-five thousand individuals mediated in six
hundred community mediation centers around the United States,
mostly as volunteers. 49 Most mediators in community mediation
centers provide services to their clients on a part-time basis free of
44 See Nemko, supra note 36.
45 E-mail from Eric Galton, Mediator, to author (Mar. 28, 2008, 11:33:55 EST) (on file with

author).
46 Nemko, supra note 36.

See also BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,

OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 2008-09 EDITION: JUDGES, MAGISTRATES, AND OTHER

JUDICIAL WORKERS, http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos272.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2008)
[hereinafter OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK] (estimating that there are about 8,500
mediators, arbitrators, and conciliators in the United States). These mediators, arbitrators,
and conciliators earn on average $56,380. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES, MAY 2007, 23-1022 ARBITRATORS,
MEDIATORS, AND CONCILIATORS http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes231022.htm (last visited

Nov. 24, 2008) [hereinafter OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES].
See OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, supra note 46.
48 LOVENHEIM, supra note 6, at 51.
49 GOLDBERG ETAL., supra note 20, at 591.
47

20091

Making Peace and Making Money

charge, though "[a] few centers pay their mediators a small stipend"
($25 per case), and there are very few salaried positions. 50 But,
community mediation centers remain one of the best ways to get
51
training and to become known to mediation colleagues.
2. Salaried Mediators
Federal, state, and local governments employ around two
thousand mediators. 52 Their average annual salaries range from
$56,580 for local governments, $60,080 for state governments, and
$109,490 for the executive branch of the federal government. 53 The
Department of Agriculture, for example, has thirty full-time
employees involved in ADR. 54
The Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, a federal agency promoting stable labor55
management relations, employs about 120 full-time mediators.
Furthermore, the federal government operates a Shared Neutrals
Program where government employees are trained as mediators and
are reassigned for a short time to a different agency to mediate
workplace disputes in that agency. 56 They generally receive only
their salary and are not additionally compensated for mediation
work.

57

Corporations,
insurance
companies,
labor
organizations,
universities, and law firms employ an additional several thousand
58
mediators.
Most trial courts around the country have established mediation
programs to try to resolve civil disputes. In some states, such as
Florida, mediation is mandatory in many cases: a judge may order
parties to mediate and they are required to appear in at least one
session or risk being held in contempt. 59 Courts in some states, like
California, where mediation in child custody and visitation cases is
required, employ full-time salaried mediators to handle divorce
50See

LOVENHEIM, supra note 6, at 129 tbl.6.1, 130.

51 See id. at 131.

52 See OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES, supra note 46. The total number is 2,540,
but includes conciliators and arbitrators.
Id.
54 LOVENHEIM, supra note 6, at 135.
55 Id. at 136.
56 See U.S. Office of Personnel Mgmt., Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Resource Guide
53

133, http://www.opm.gov/er/adrguide/section3-shared-neutrals.asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2008).
51 See id.
58 See OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES, supra note 46. The total number is 2,560,
but includes conciliators and arbitrators.
59 See LOVENHEIM, supra note 6, at 131.
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disputes. 60 In most states, where judges are authorized to refer
cases to mediation, however, mediators are self-employed
61
professionals who provide their services for a fee.
3. Mediators in Private Practice
Some mediators in private practice work alone as solo
62
practitioners, others form partnerships, still others are on panels.
As independent contractors, they are paid depending on how much
63
business they generate.
The number of mediators in private practice is difficult to
estimate because there are no licensing requirements. The ABA
Section of Dispute Resolution now has over 17,000 members, 64 but
that number is both overinclusive and underinclusive: it includes
lawyers who mediate only a few times a year or are just interested
in alternative dispute resolution, yet it includes few non-lawyer
mediators. Observers speculate that there are between five and ten
thousand full-time providers of ADR services in the United States
today.65 While the number may seem large, it is dwarfed by
66
1,143,358 lawyers admitted to practice in the United States.
More accurate figures come from court rosters in states where
mediators are paid for court-referred work (as opposed to
volunteering). Many mediators in private practice, particularly in
states with mandatory mediation programs, rely on court references
as their primary source of mediation work. 67 Mediators who want
Id. at 131-32.
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure allow parties to select their own mediator within ten
days of being ordered to mediate, FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.720(f), and more than ninety percent of
parties agree on a mediator. See Florida State Courts, Alternative Dispute Resolution,
http://www.flcourts.org/gen..public/adr/adrintro.shtml (last visited Oct. 2, 2008).
62 Private alternative dispute resolution companies, such as JAMS, keep a list of seasoned
mediators, and clients choose their mediator from the list.
JAMS mediators are
predominantly retired judges, who work exclusively with JAMS. See LOVENHEIM, supra note
6, at 142. They handle high-stake disputes and earn between $150,000 and $1,000,000 per
year. Id.
60

61

63
64

Id.
See ABA SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, YEAR IN REVIEW

2006-2007 1 (2007),

available at http://www.abanet.org/dispute/documentslYear-in ReviewFINAL2006_7.pdf.
65 The number is based on discussions with ACR and experienced mediators in private
practice.
66

See AM. BAR ASS'N, NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION BY STATE 3 (2007), available at

http://www.abanet.org/marketresearchl2007-Natl-Lawyer FINALonepage.pdf.
Since
mediators deal with disputes and are often trained as lawyers, the comparison is appropriate.
67 1 am grateful to Robert Benjamin and Robert A. Creo for this observation. See also AM.
ARBITRATION ASS'N, supra note 22, at 28 (noting that seventy-three percent of surveyed
Fortune companies used mediation because it was court-mandated).
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to be on the court roster usually have to be certified. 68 They must
complete a certain number of hours of mediation training and meet
specified standards. 69 Many court-connected mediation programs
are limited to lawyers. 70 In some states, judges will select certified
mediators on a rotating basis, but most court programs allow the
71
parties to choose their mediator.
For example, in Florida, which probably has the largest and the
most developed court-connected mediation program, there are 5,377
registered mediators as of December 2005.72 But, according to a
court administrator, probably ten percent of the state's registered
mediators do ninety percent of the work. 73 Some states regulate
mediator fees, but many do not, and mediators charge their market
rate. 74 The rates for mediation services vary depending on the
quality of the mediator and on the local market: in California, the
median divorce mediator on the court roster charges $300 per hour,
and not one charges less than $150 per hour; 75 in Virginia, on the
other hand, the median mediator charges less than $125 per hour,
76
and only the top five percent charge more than $200 per hour.
The vast majority of mediators offer their services on a part-time
basis, either by choice or, more commonly, because of lack of
demand. One notable group of part-time mediation practitioners by
choice is university professors. 77 Unlike most aspirant mediators,
they have little or no overhead, are presumed to be neutral and
competent, frequently publish and testify about ADR, and have a
ready pool of potential clients from the students they taught.78
Of the few thousand mediators in private practice who are able to
mediate full-time, the majority earn $50,000 or less. There are
68

See LOVENHEIM, supra note 6, at 133.

69 See id.

Id. at 58, 133.
See id. at 134.
See Florida State Courts, supranote 61.
73 LOVENHEIM, supra note 6, at 134-35.
74 See Deborah Hensler, A Research Agenda: What We Need to Know About CourtConnected ADR, 6 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 15, 17 (1999).
7- See, e.g., Superior Court of California, County of Santa Barbara, CADRe Mediator Fee
Schedule (2008), http://www.sbcadre.org/fees-med.htm (listing mediator fees for court
administered dispute resolution).
76 See Virginia's Judicial System, Virginia Court Certified Mediators Search Results,
http://www.courts.state.va.us/drs/searchable mediatordirectory.html (follow "Search for a
Mediator with Specific Qualifications" hyperlink; then select "over $200" under "Customary
Hourly Fee" and search for mediators) (last visited Oct. 2, 2008).
77 E-mail from Robert A. Creo, Mediator, to author (Apr. 6, 2008 18:11:25 EST) (on file
with author).
70
71
72

78

Id.
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fewer than a thousand mediators, and possibly a few hundred, who
make a good living, grossing $200,000 or more per year. 79 Only a
couple dozen or so mediators, primarily former judges practicing
with JAMSs 0 and a few high-end commercial mediators in markets
where the cost of living is high and, as a result, so are mediation
fees, are able to consistently bill over $1,000,000 per year.81

III. WHY Do So FEW MEDIATORS MAKE MONEY?
The previous section reviewed where mediators work. Those
mediating in community centers usually volunteer, while salaried
mediators are usually employed by the government and
organizations.8 2 Neither group directly competes with mediators in
private practice, although their existence may reduce the size of the
market for privately compensated mediation services.
This section analyzes the reasons for socially suboptimal excess
entry of mediators in private practice, and suggests that overoptimism and the lack of formal barriers to entry cause it. Since
mediators in private practice are the focus of this article, this
section explores the determinants of supply and demand for
mediation services in that market alone.8 3 While it is true that a
"massive amount of. . . mediation work"8 4 is going on in
organizations, little of it is compensated and purchased separately,
and is instead part of a managerial or government job. This section
then analyzes the characteristics of labor markets and applies
economic theory of labor markets to the mediation profession.
A. Demand and Supply in the Market for Mediation
The market for private mediation services works like any other
79 Most of the mediators I interviewed provided similar estimates.

80 JAMS is the country's largest private dispute resolution provider, with mediators
practicing all around the United States. LOVENHEIM, supra note 6, at 141-42. It lists over
200 mediators who work for JAMS as independent contractors, and are all experienced judges
or attorneys with a track-record in dispute resolution. JAMS, THE RESOLUTION EXPERTS,
FACT SHEET 1, http://www.jamsadr.comimagesPDF/corporate-fact-sheet.pdf (last visited
Oct. 3, 2008).

81 Telephone Interview with Robert A. Creo, Mediator, in Pittsburgh, Pa. (Mar. 21, 2008).
82 See LOVENHEIM, supra note 6, at 128-29 tbl.6.1.
83 As explained supra in Part II.A, there is not one single mediation market in the United
States. But, for the purposes of this article, the different markets can be lumped together
because the analysis applies equally to each market separately. There are important
differences between different jurisdictions and different subject matters of mediation, but
they are not the focus of this article.
84 Honeyman et al., supra note 27, at 505.
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market, and is a function of demand for and supply of mediation
services. Demand for mediation services depends on consumer
income (e.g., wealthier clients can purchase more mediation
services, and a wealthier country can pay for more mediation
services), the price of substitutes (e.g., cost of litigation) and
complements (e.g., legal fees), tastes (e.g., court-mandated
mediation, and efforts at marketing mediation), expectations about
the future (e.g., longer trials), and the number of consumers (e.g.,
court delays may increase demand for mediation).
Supply of
mediation services depends on the cost of production (e.g., training,
certification), technology (e.g., BlackBerry, ease of travel,
government policy, such as mandating mediation for divorce all
increase the supply of mediation services), expectations (e.g., of
future price changes), and the number of sellers (e.g., many enter
the mediation market because it is appealing to offer services as a
peace-maker).
Private demand for mediation has been underwhelming as most
people "remain leery of negotiation as a means of settling
disputes."' 5 Some mediators have suggested that the "relatively low
usage [of mediation results] from the fact that. . . people [do not]
know [about] mediation ...or how it could be used to solve their
[disputes].86 Others retort that demand for mediation has been
flagging because the marketing message for mediation has been
ineffective.8 7 Mediators do not offer clients what they are looking
for: a process where the prerequisite is not to be trusting,
reasonable, or logical, but a process where they can be angry and
resentful, yet one that works and one where they will not be
exploited.88 In a survey of New Jersey residents, only 2 out of 400
respondents mentioned mediation as a possible means of resolving
disputes, and neither spoke positively about it.89
The study
suggests that American citizens are committed to litigation and "are
not anxious to give up courts for mediation." 90 "Low rates of
voluntary usage" and the existence of court-initiated mediation
85 Robert Benjamin, Guerilla Mediation:
Management
of
Conflict,
http://www.mediate.com//articles/guerilla.cfm.
86

The Use of Warfare Strategies
Mediate.com,
(Aug.

in the
1999),

FORREST S. MOSTEN, MEDIATION CAREER GUIDE: A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO BUILDING A

SUCCESSFUL PRACTICE 194 (2001).
87

Benjamin, supra note 85.

88 See id.

89 Susan S. Silbey, The Emperor's New Clothes: Mediation Mythology and Markets, 2002 J.
DISP. RESOL. 171, 174.
90 Id.
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programs support the argument that mediation is almost entirely a
"supply side ... phenomenon." 91 Mediation programs did not begin
An alternative
to flourish until mandated by legislation. 92
explanation is that litigation as a default makes it less likely that
93
the parties will mediate, since mediation requires their consent.
There are also concerns that mediation is becoming second-class
justice: quick and cheap, but more likely to result in one party being
taken for a ride. 94 Finally, a large percentage of disputes, perhaps
as many as half, are mediated in free public programs, further
reducing demand for private mediation at the low end of the
95
market.
On the supply side, the market for private mediation is inundated
with would-be mediators because of the low formal barriers to
entry-entering the market requires little more than forty hours of
training and a new shingle-aspirant mediator over-optimism, and
the fact that mediation is viewed as a more satisfying profession
than law, from where most mediators hail. 96
Whereas lawyers help their clients win a case at the expense of
the other party, mediation is viewed as "helping parties reach a
mutually satisfying resolution," 97 as a "kinder-gentler" alternative
to lawyering. Furthermore, over-optimism of aspirant mediators
coupled with mediation training, which may make it appear that
entering the market is easier than it really is, results in inefficient
excess entry into the market. 98 Many mediators who cannot find
work become mediation trainers. 99 The profession trains too many

91 Id. at 174 n.14.
92 Id. See also AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N., supra note 22, at 28 (noting that the vast majority
of Fortunecompanies used mediation because it was court-mandated).
93 See Barendrecht & de Vries, supra note 28, at 83.
94 Telephone Interview with Robert Benjamin, Mediator, Mediation and Conflict
Management Services, in Portland, Or. (Mar. 28, 2008).
95 Telephone Interview with Robert A. Creo, supra note 81. Many federal and state cases
'are siphoned from the private sector market" by the federal government's Shared Neutrals
Program and other similar programs. E-mail from Robert A. Creo, Mediator, in Pittsburgh,
Pa., to author (Apr. 6, 2008, 22:06:21 EST) (on file with author). See also U.S. Office of
Personnel Mgmt., supra note 56, at 133.
96 "ADR is seen as 'fun,' as opposed to the drudgery of much of law practice. And it still
enjoys a romanticized public image ... " Honeyman et al., supra note 37, at 165-66.
97 KRIVIS & LUCKS, supra note 7, at 17.
98 See generally ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILLIP J. CooK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY 8-9

(1995) (arguing that an unjustified degree of confidence prevails among entrants to
competitive employment fields, resulting in an undesirable abundance of job candidates).
99 E-mail from John Bickerman, Mediator, to author (Mar. 23, 2008, 16:37:58 EST) (on file
with author).
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people for jobs that do not exist. 100 Market entrants invest their
time and money in mediation based on an overly optimistic
calculation of their odds of success. 10 1 Many beginner mediators,
except for retired judges, simply cannot offer clients what they are
looking for: a person with experience, reputation, and authority.
This produces individual and social waste: there are direct costs
because individuals spend money on mediation training, and
opportunity costs because individuals spend time pursuing a career
02
that was illusory instead of a different career. 1
As a result of weak demand and excessive supply, there are more
mediators than there are mediation jobs. 10 3 While the above
rationales begin to explain why so few of the more than 100,000
trained mediators are able to make a living as mediators, they do
not explain why income distribution in private mediation is a "steep
pyramid." 104 The following section provides possible answers.
B. Characteristicsof the Mediation Labor Market
Human capital theory predicts that pay for labor will depend on
observable employee productivity, which will in turn depend on
effort and talent.105 There is mounting evidence that a number of
labor markets no longer operate in accordance with the human
capital theory, but rather as "winner-take-all" markets. 10 6 In those
markets, pay depends on relative performance, rather than absolute
performance, and tends to be concentrated. 107 The best performers
are wealthy, whereas second-best receive only a tiny fraction of the
best performer's pay, even though they might be only marginally
less productive. 0 8 There is evidence to suggest that the market for
private mediation services is a winner-take-all market.
1. Economic Theory of Labor Markets
Human capital theory, the dominant economic theory of wages,

100

Id.

101See FRANK & COOK, supra note 98, at 8-9.

102 See generally id. at 8-9 (arguing that an overcrowding of job applicants leaves most
candidates worse off, due to wasted resources and potential opportunities foregone).
103 See Nemko, supra note 36.
104

Bickerman, supra note 99.

105 See FRANK & COOK, supra note 98, at 89-90.
106
107

See id. at 2-4, 92-94.
Id. at 24.

108 See id. at 94.
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"explains [the] differences in wage rates by differences in education,
training, experience, intelligence, [talent,] motivation, and other
human factors that [affect] productivity."'' 0 9 The theory predicts
that workers (or providers of services) will be "paid in proportion to
the value of their productive contributions." 110 In other words, in
"markets
that
economists
normally
study,... reward
11
depends ... on absolute performance."'
Pay is distributed based
on talent (education, training, experience) and on the willingness to
expend effort (motivation). 112 A veterinarian's pay, for the most
part, depends on how many animals she sees. An hourly employee's
pay, while lower than that of a veterinarian who may have spent an
additional ten years in school, depends not only on talent but also
on the number of hours worked. As a result, someone who works
ten percent harder or is ten percent more talented should receive
13
ten percent more pay. 1
In winner-take-all markets, however, reward depends on relative
performance and tends to concentrate rewards in the hands of
few.1 4 In those markets, a ten percent increase in talent or effort
can cause pay to differ by ten thousand percent or more. 115 While
those near the top win big, everyone else is far behind, and their
reward "bearls] little relationship to how close they were to
winning." 116 The difference in pay received by the star of a
Broadway show and "her understudy is almost always far more
than proportional to the differences in their [ability to sing and
dance]." 117
"[This] reward structure has long been common in entertainment,
sports, and the arts."118 In Mozart's time, musician compensation
for the best performers was much greater than for less renowned
performers. 119 However, technology (radio, records, and later video)
allowed a single entertainer to reach many more people, increasing

109 Id.
110 Id.

at 89.
at 17.

M, Id. at 24.

See id. at 17.
Note that firms will only pay for productivity that is observable. Hence, unobservable
differences in productivity or effort will not be compensated.
114 FRANK & COOK, supra note 98, at 24.
112
113

115 See id. at 17.

116 Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-AlU Markets: Easing the Case
for ProgressiveTaxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 3 (1998).
117 Id. at 5.
118 FRANK & COOK, supra note 98, at 3.
119 See id. at 45.
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demand for the best performer and reducing demand for the secondbest performer. 120 As a result, today the very best musicians are
millionaires, while the second-best earn a modest salary in
orchestras or play music only as a hobby.
In their book, The Winner-Take-All Society, economists Robert H.
Frank and Phillip J. Cook argue that an increasing number of labor
12 1
markets have come to resemble the entertainment market.
Although income disparity in the market for mediation services is
increasing, it will likely never be as uneven as it is in the market for
musical performance, because mediation cannot be easily
reproduced. Nevertheless, for the reasons explored in the next
subsection, income in the market for mediation services is and will
likely continue to be very unevenly distributed.
122
2. Winner-Take-All Markets for Services

"Some winner-take-all markets arise because of special conditions
' 23
on the supply side, [which] influence [the] cost[] of production."'
"Other[s] ... arise because of special conditions on the demand side,
124
[which] influence the [price] buyers are willing to pay."'
The first winner-take-all markets, such as the market for musical
performance, arose because the services of best performers could
easily be reproduced. 12 5 Economies of scale in production and
distribution resulted in a natural tendency for one product-for
example, CD of La Bohdme by Luciano Pavarotti-to dominate the
market, even when there exist close substitutes. 126 Mediation is
quite the opposite of the musical performance market. A mediator's
service is very personal, cannot be reproduced, nor can it easily be
delegated or divided into smaller pieces. Yet, for a number of
reasons, incomes of mediators, while not as divergent as those of
musicians, are nevertheless uneven.
One of the supply-side sources of winner-take-all markets are
27
lock-ins through learning or investment (i.e., path dependencies). 1

120
121

See id. at 1-2.
See id. at 3-4.

122 Frank and Cook describe a number of sources of winner-take-all markets. I deliberately
chose to include only those that affect markets for services, rather than goods, because they
are the only ones relevant to the market for mediators.
123 FRANK & COOK, supra note 98, at 32.
124 Id.
125

126
127

Id.
See id. at 33.
See id. at 34-35.
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Graduates of the best undergraduate institutions are likely to be
admitted to the best law schools, and are more likely to be elected or
appointed as judges. After they retire, they-as former judges-are
more likely to be invited to join the JAMS panel of mediators, and
as such are much more likely to command high fees from the outset
and get a steady flow of cases. 128 Although JAMS is very successful,
path dependencies in education are not the most important source
of mediator winner-take-all markets.
While many successful
mediators have attended top law schools, many did not. 129 But,
path dependencies contribute to winner-take-all markets by
lowering the costs of acquiring information. Users of mediation are
likely to use the same mediator over and over again, not necessarily
because the mediator is the best, but because they are already
familiar with her.
In addition to path dependencies, other positive-feedback
processes, where success breeds success, create winner-take-all
markets.' 30 These include network economies (e.g., PC machines
are more popular than Unix machines because more people have PC
machines) and perceptions of quality.13 1 E-mail, for example, has
significantly reduced information costs and has created closed
networks of mediators that operate at a much higher level of
efficiency than other networks. But, unless a mediator is in the
network, she will not be selected.13 2 In addition, when information
is costly to acquire, consumers of services tend to rely on proxies for
quality: 13 3 a person who was selected to mediate a large commercial
128 JAMS is the largest for-profit ADR firm in the United States. JAMS get the higheststake and best-paid mediation cases and many, if not most, of the mediators on the JAMS
panel are among the highest earners in the profession. At the time of writing this article,
JAMS has 251 mediators on its panel, 159 of whom are retired judges (63%). See LOVENHEIM,
supra
note
6,
at
141-42;
JAMS,
JAMS
Arbitrator(s)Mediator(s),
http://www.jamsadr.com/neutrals/neutrals.asp (last visited May 10, 2008). According to the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) study, companies received mediator nominees from
private ADR providers, such as JAMS or AAA, in 30% of cases. This number understates the
number of cases decided by those providers, since they are likely included in other categories
as well (e.g., previous experience (24%), court (19%), mutual proposal from both parties (5%)).
See AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, supra note 22, at 10 tbl.6.
129 For example, fewer than half of the mediators I interviewed attended a top-twenty law
school, yet all are very successful.
130 See FRANK & COOK, supra note 98, at 36.
131

See

id.

National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA), an organization that represents
individual employees in cases involving employment discrimination and other employmentrelated matters, maintains a list of mediators and hires almost exclusively from the list by
sending out an e-mail inquiring who is available. Unless the mediator is on the list, she will
never be hired by NELA. I thank David Hoffman for this observation.
133 See FRANK & COOK, supra note 98, at 36-37.
132
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dispute and performed well is much more likely to be selected to
mediate again for the same client or to be referred to another client,
even though she may be only marginally better (or perceived as
such) than the second-best choice.
Variations in quality of
mediation are hard to observe, and clients must rely on the few
sources of information available, often word-of-mouth. "Competence
is... necessary, but.. . not sufficient, [to develop] a strong
134
reputation" and a massive income.
The demand for a top-notch service may also stem from the desire
to avoid adverse outcomes from having bought the second-best.
Even if the service fails, the buyer can comfort herself by knowing
that she purchased the best. 13 5 But, if the service performs well,
there is no way of knowing if the second-best would have performed
just as well. This skews consumer choice towards the best service
available, particularly when the stakes are high. For example,
Richard Scruggs, one of the best-known plaintiffs' lawyers, hired
John Keker, one of the most prestigious white-collar lawyers, to
defend him in the criminal contempt charge for attempted bribery of
a judge. 136 Hiring Keker, who is based in San Francisco, was many
times more expensive than hiring an only marginally less qualified
local attorney. But, facing seventy-five years in prison, Scruggs was
137
apparently unwilling to risk hiring the second-best attorney.
Similarly, an experienced mediator reports that when an attorney
with a high-value case refers it to mediation, he is "never going to be
138
criticized for selecting a well-known mediator."
Lastly, concentration of wealth in the hands of few will create
winner-take-all markets.1 39
For example, attorneys with rich
clients will be able to charge much higher fees than their
counterparts with poorer clientele. Similarly, commercial mediators
1 40
are able to charge higher fees than domestic mediators.
Diminishing marginal utility of money means that individuals or
entities with "very high incomes attach ... little value to tens of
thousands, or even millions, of dollars."14 1 Alternately, clients tend
Id. at 93.
135 See id. at 42-43.
1, Jenny Jarvie, The Nation Katrina Lawyer at the Eye of a Storm, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30,
2007, at 15.
134

137

Id.

Bickerman, supra note 99.
FRANK & COOK, supra note 98, at 43.
140 See e-mail from William Baten, Mediator, to author (Mar. 25, 2008, 22:19:12 EST) (on
file with author).
141 McMahon & Abreu, supra note 116, at 35.
138
139
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to compare transaction costs (i.e., legal fees, filing fees, mediator
fees) to the value of their claim and think in percentage terms. In a
$200 million dispute, a million dollars does not seem like much. But
in a divorce, where the parties are dividing $250,000 in assets, a fee
of a few thousand dollars can be significant. As a result, wealthier
clients (or clients with larger claims) are willing to pay much larger
sums for the same service than more budget-constrained
individuals.
3. Success Breeds Success in the Market for Mediators in Private
Practice
Economists have reported increasing incomes of top performers in
a number of professions, including lawyers, dentists, accountants,
doctors, and salespeople. 142 One possible explanation based on the
human capital theory described above is "that the [top] performers
have [become] 'better' relative to their colleagues." 143 If distribution
of human capital changed, income distribution should change also.
But, no one has been able to identify the improvement in quality or
44
explain why it came about. 1
An alternative explanation is that winner-take-all markets have
spread to the non-celebrity professions, such as mediation. Only a
small fraction of cases support fees of $10,000 per day or more, and
a small "inner circle" of top mediators get the call for those cases. 145
They get selected because they have a solid track record, because
they have been mediating for long enough to have name recognition
as mediators and be members of closed networks, 146 but also
because they are perceived by potential clients as good because of
their personal or other qualities (e.g., having been a judge, being a
speaker at an ADR conference, or publishing). 14 7 Furthermore, in
high-stake cases with multiple parties it is easier for lawyers and

See FRANK & COOK, supra note 98, at 86-88.
Id. at 89.
144 Id. at 98-99.
145 Baten, supra note 140.
146 E-mail from Steve Cerveris, Mediator, to author (Apr. 1, 2008, 12:34:02 EST) (on file
with author).
147 Perception of quality is not the same as quality. In being selected as a mediator,
perceptions and reputation often matter more than objective quality, which-by any
measure-is difficult if not impossible to measure. Many former judges, for example, are in
high demand, although they may not have much experience as mediators, and sometimes
pressure clients to reach an agreement they would not have agreed to with a less evaluative
mediator.
142
143
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parties to agree on using a mediator with a national reputation. 148
This way, if mediation fails, the lawyers can tell their parties that
they tried everything to avoid litigating and incurring additional
legal fees, and company bosses can assure their directors and
shareholders that they did the best they could.
IV. WHY Do SOME MEDIATORS MAKE So MUCH MONEY?
The previous section explored the determinants of demand and
supply in the market for mediation services, and looked into
possible causes for why so few mediators in private practice can
make a good living. This section further analyzes the reasons for
mediator income distribution, including product non-homogeneity,
organizational structure of the profession, de facto barriers to entry,
such as mediator selection and market segmentation, and elasticity
of demand.
A. Non-homogeneity: Characteristicsof the Highest-PaidMediation
Professionals
One of the main requirements for a perfectly competitive market
is that the product is homogeneous, that is, largely the same as all
other products on the market. Based on the foregoing discussion,
the market for private mediation does not satisfy this requirement.
As a result, top mediators do not directly compete against secondtier commercial mediators (who may still be making a very
comfortable living), who, in turn, do not compete against subsequent
tiers. There is relatively little price sensitivity and the highest-paid
mediation professionals are able to charge high fees without fear of
losing business to lower-cost providers.
A good mediator is hard to describe and is usually referred to as
"you'll know it when you see it."149 The reason is that, as one
mediator put it, "mediation is much more complex than
litigation." 150
It requires excellent mediation skills, complex
analytical skills, and the ability to quickly process a substantial
amount of information.
It requires the ability to move cases
relatively swiftly toward settlement. It also requires excellent
interpersonal skills: the best mediators are good listeners, who can

148
149
150

Baten, supra note 140.
Telephone Interview with Robert A. Creo, supranote 81.
Id.
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"read" people and have the intuitive ability to sense the things that
are not being said. 151 They are compassionate and empathetic, and
can focus all their intellectual energy on the dispute in front of
them. 52
They are trustworthy and able to convey their
trustworthiness to the parties. They enjoy and are comfortable
1 53
communicating with all types of people, and they are likeable.
Great mediators are creative and able to teach parties how to
154
mediate during the mediation without controlling the process.
They are "chameleon-like": usually evaluative, but able to adjust
their demeanor and mediation style to the party and the dispute. 155
They are also calm and patient, and have both a sense of humor and
a "sense of drama." 156 They can quietly signal to their clients that if
the dispute can be settled, they are the ones that can settle it. 157
They are also good businessmen, who market themselves well-not
by using traditional marketing channels, but by always performing
well in front of clients and their attorneys.1 58 Many, if not most, top
mediators have formal or informal business plans and excellent case
managers, who they pay well. 159 Great mediators also tend to be
the most hard-working and committed to the profession of
mediation. They are "mediation activists": they found, lead, and
join professional mediation associations; publish; and teach.1 60 And
most importantly, the mediators who are frequently selected by
attorneys are the ones who have been able to stay in the field long
enough to develop reputations as great mediators. 161
As is readily apparent from the above list of great mediator skills
and qualities, very few of them can be taught in a mediation
training class or a graduate program. A mediation trainer cannot
train would-be mediators to be smart.
She cannot "teach
empathy." 16 2 She cannot teach the natural instinct and intuition.

151

LOVENHEIM, supra note 6, at 90.

152

155

See Creo, supra note 95; Baten, supranote 140.
Cerveris, supra note 146.
See id.
Id.

156

See LOVENHEIM, supra note 6, at 92-93, 95-96.

153
154

See Creo, supra note 95.
Telephone Interview with Robert A. Creo, supra note 81.
159 See Creo, supra note 95; E-mail from Robert A. Creo, Mediator, to author (Apr. 7, 2008,
10:28:26 EST) (on file with author). See also KRIVIS & LUCKS, supra note 7, at 150 (discussing
the importance of mediators' assistants and how they deserve to be compensated well).
160 Creo, supra note 95.
161 See Baten, supra note 140.
162 Stephen B. Goldberg & Margaret L. Shaw, The Secrets of Successful (and Unsuccessful)
157
158

Mediators, 8 DISP. RESOL. ALERT 1, 6 (2008), http://www.jamsadr.com/images/PDF/DRA-2008-
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But, she can teach good technique, while good judgment is acquired
with age and through practice. 163 Although mediation training is
necessary to become an effective mediator, hands-on experience is
the most important factor predicting high settlement rates.164 One
successful mediator observed that "it usually takes about 30
mediations to even approach a point where you are ready to charge
for your services."'165 While this may sound like little, many fulltime mediators-which means they are more successful than eighty
or more percent of all mediators-only mediate 100 or so cases per
year.166 Since beginners are less busy, it might take a beginner
mediator a full year or longer to get enough experience to start
charging. Hence, without paid internship programs for beginner
mediators, private mediation will remain a possibility as a second or
third career, after the mediator has sufficient financial resources to
67
survive a few years with little or no income.1
Furthermore, mediation training sessions do not teach the
business skills necessary to survive in the cutthroat profession.
While reputation, one of the most important sources of mediation
caseload, and hence income, cannot be taught or bought, many
successful mediators are very active in the mediation community,
are most active in ADR associations, frequently speak publicly
about mediation, and publish relevant articles in professional and
business journals. 168 What this means for mediation training, is
that it should not oversell its potential and create expectations that
cannot be realized. 169 Finally, what this means is that unless
cultural notions about dispute resolution profoundly change and
people are willing to pay for mediation of all kinds of disagreements,
only those who love to mediate should continue doing so, without

01.pdf.
163 Telephone Interview with Robert Benjamin, supra note 94.
164 See Ignazio J. Ruvolo, Appellate Mediation-"Settling"the Last Frontierof ADR, 42 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 177, 216-17 (2005).

165Kathy Fragnoli, Ideas for Creating a Market for Your Services, in ADR PERSONALITIES
AND PRACTICE TIPS 11, 13 (James J. Alfini & Eric R. Galton, eds., 1998).
166 See Cerveris, supra note 146. There is a group of full-time environmental mediators
who might mediate only half a dozen cases per year, each of which might last several years.
167 As discussed supra Part II.C., there exist salaried positions for beginner mediators,
either as mediators, or as party representatives in mediation. Insurance companies, in
particular, may be a good career starting point for would-be mediators. There, they can gain
the necessary experience in mediation, albeit as a party representative, to be able to later
move on to full-time private mediation practice.
168 Many of the mediators I interviewed confirmed this.
169 See Howard S. Bellman, Some Reflections on the Practice of Mediation, 14 NEGOTIATION
J. 205, 207 (1998).
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the pressure and the expectation of a paycheck.
B. OrganizationalStructure of the Mediation Profession
Mediation is a lonely profession; many mediators in private
practice work alone.
Even the largest mediation firm, JAMS,
employs only a few associates, while its mediators are independent
contractors. 170
As a result, there are few private practice
opportunities for beginner mediators. 171
A leading casebook on dispute resolution asserts that the reason
that mediators generally practice as solo practitioners is because
mediation is "a hands-on skill" that cannot easily be delegated to
junior associates. 172 Practicing mediators agree. Unlike law firms,
which need an army of associates to review documents and draft
motions, mediation work is individualized and generally cannot be
broken into small pieces. 173 "Mediators work alone" and perform
"all substantive work."'7 4
They do not and cannot delegate
professional work, such as reading party submissions, to associates
or paralegals, because they themselves must be familiar with the
material in order to perform their task as mediators. 175 "The bulk"
176
of the work is spent "in direct communication with the parties."
Furthermore, mediation is less time consuming than legal work.
Clients buy mediation services only when they have a large enough
dispute to justify hiring an external mediator, and the work is
usually completed within a couple of days or less. Legal services, on
the other hand, are complex and "require the simultaneous efforts of
177
a number of ...attorneys."'

170 See JAMS, JAMS Career Center, http://www.jamsadr.com/contactus/careers.asp
(last
visited Nov. 24, 2008).
171 Several of the mediators I interviewed noted that while recent law school graduates
cannot just hang their shingle and open up a practice, they can slowly work their way into the
profession by volunteering in community mediation centers, by settling cases referred by the
court, or by working for an insurance company and representing it in disputes it decides to
mediate (i.e., working as a party representative and not as a mediator).
172 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 20, at 597.
173 Telephone Interview with Prof. John Lande, supra note 41.
174

See

ROBERT

A.

CREO,

COMPREHENSIVE

MEDIATION

FEE

SCHEDULE

(2007),

http://www.mediate.com/creo/docs/March 14 2007 FeeSchedule NonMedMal.pdf.
175 See id.
176 Id.
177 James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, When Knowledge is an Asset: Explaining the
OrganizationalStructure of Large Law Firms, 25 J. LAB. ECON. 201, 215 (2007). A large law
firm associate will usually bill in excess of 2,000 hours per year. A full-time mediator, on the
other hand, will bill between 600 and 1,200 hours per year. See Cerveris, supra note 146.
This is not to say that mediators do not work hard, but rather that the nature of the work is

2009]

Making Peace and Making Money

Mediation is also a very personal and people-oriented service:
clients and lawyers do not only look for a mediator who can settle
their case, but also for someone who they can relate to on a personal
level, someone who comes across as genuine. 178 Clients book a
mediator because they want to hire her specifically, and not just any
mediator. They believe that she is the one who can assist them in
79
their dispute.
Although the majority of full-time mediators in private practice
are lawyers, few practice in law firms. A number of law firms have
ADR departments that also offer mediation, but most lawyers in law
firms cannot make a living solely as mediators because of conflicts
of interest, both existing and potential. Also, since mediation
generates less income than other legal work, most law firms avoid
mediating for clients. 180
They like and
Finally, many mediators are "lone rangers."''
prefer working on their own, and form partnerships only for
practical reasons: so that they do not have to turn away clients
when they are sick or go on vacation, so that they can share the
costs of administrative staff and marketing, and so that they have
82
someone to socialize with.'
All of these reasons combined encourage mediators to practice
alone or in a small-firm setting, where the only staff might be an
administrative assistant. Mediators' overhead is low (twenty to
twenty-five percent of gross revenues, and no more than thirty
percent)18 3 and each mediator keeps the majority of the revenues
without the need or the incentive to employ junior mediators.' 8 4 As
a result, there is virtually no demand for junior mediators, and
there exist few opportunities to gain experience and exposure to
practice alongside seasoned mediators while receiving a salary.

very different.
178 See KRIVIS & LUCKS, supra note 7, at 33-34.
179 See id. at 35.
180 Telephone Interview with Robert A. Creo, supra note 81.
181 Telephone Interview with Robert Benjamin, supranote 94.
182 See KRIvIS & LUCKS, supra note 7, at 110.
183 E-mail from Robert A. Creo, Mediator, to author (Apr. 6, 2008, 14:56:10 EST) (on file
with author).
184 Some top mediators, for example Robert A. Creo and Jeffrey Krivis, have employed and
mentored junior mediators in their offices, but the practice is not common. See Robert A.
Creo, Arbitrator and Mediator, ADR Mentorship, http://www.rcreo.comlpg90.cfm (last visited
Sept. 20, 2008); KRMS & LUCKS, supra note 7, at 112-14. Robert A. Creo noted that he
established his mentorship program with the hope that other mediators would adopt
mentoring as a model, and make it as another way for younger mediators to get into the
profession. Creo, supranote 95.
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This characteristic tends to limit access to the market for mediation
services and results in a few mediators getting the bulk of the work.
C. De Facto Barriersto Entry
Although there are few formal barriers to entry in the market for
private mediation, there are high de facto barriers to entry.
Mediators get most of their cases from attorneys, and unless they
are on the attorneys' short list, they will not be selected to mediate
commercial disputes.18 5 And to be added to the short list, a
mediator needs a solid track record and a stellar reputation in the
legal community.
In addition, market specialization makes
branching out into other markets difficult even for existing
successful mediators, let alone beginners. Both reasons combine to
increase the cost of entry in the market for mediator services,
protect existing providers from competition, and reduce the
opportunities for beginner mediators.
1. Mediator Selection
Mediators in private practice get most of their cases, in some
places, such as Southern California, as many as ninety or ninetyfive percent, through referrals from attorneys and courts.18 6 A fair
number of domestic cases are referred by family therapists, but
attorneys remain the predominant source of mediation business.
Most parties do not get into disputes frequently enough to be a
source of business, and even in-house counsel or adjusters, who
regularly mediate, do not appear to be a common source of
referrals.1 8 7 Mediators also get referrals from colleagues with whom
they share bar functions, committees, and ADR functions, and
former trainees,1 8 8 but these tend to be less common sources of
clients.
The main reason for attorney domination of the mediator
selection process is that most of the private mediators' caseload is
disputes already in litigation or about to be litigated.1 8 9 Parties

See Cerveris, supra note 146.
See id.
187 See E-mail from Tracy Allen, Mediator, to author (Mar. 22, 2008, 09:43:48 EST) (on file
with author).
185
186

188

Id.

See E-mail from Steve Cerveris, Mediator, to author (Apr. 6, 2008, 13:18:37 EST) (on
file with author).
189
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with a problem first consult an attorney to help them decide how to
pursue the case, and do not consider mediation. 190 Unless ordered
by court, relatively few parties are willing to mediate before
pursuing a complaint through pre-trial motions. 19 1 This is the
result of asymmetric information and risk-aversion: parties are
unwilling to begin negotiations until they have some information on
how good is the other side's case. In addition, there is a principalagent problem as lawyers themselves are unwilling to lose control
and potential legal fees from litigation by referring the case to
192
mediation.
Attorneys as gatekeepers not only decide whether and when a
case will be mediated, but also who will mediate it. Selecting a
mediator is "an important and difficult task." 193 Attorneys, as
repeat players, are more familiar with practitioners in the
community and clients rely on their attorneys to shop for mediation
services. 194 If the case is referred to mediation by a court, mediator
selection is often limited to certified mediators on the court roster,
but this requirement only rarely restricts mediator selection, since
most mediators, full- or part-time, are certified. 195 Typically when
parties decide to mediate the dispute, attorneys for each side submit
196
a list of names, from which the parties select their mediator.
Unless the mediator is on the attorney's short list, she will never get
selected, and getting on the list is very difficult. 197 It requires
excellent mediation skills, personal characteristics, and name
recognition.198 Above all, it requires time. Many top mediators,
unless they were celebrities in their own right or retired judges, who

190A number of mediators have noted this practice. See id. (noting that the market could
expand if the public became more familiar with mediation and individuals would choose the
mediation forum before retaining lawyers to see if they could resolve their disputes more
quickly and efficiently).
191 Interestingly, fewer than five percent of filed cases get to trial, and mediation is only
fifth on the list of reasons for the "vanishing trial." Most cases get disposed of by or settled
after summary judgment. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 483-84, 545
tbl.A-10 (2004).
192 See Sander, supra note 1, at 6.
193Lande, supranote 21, at 847.
194 Id.
195Mediators I interviewed confirmed that virtually all mediators in their community were
listed with the court and only one said he refused to be included in the court roster.
Certification usually requires training and sometimes a test, but is a low barrier to entry.
19s Cerveris, supra note 146.
197

See id.

198 See discussion supra Part W.A.
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have "a certain amount of built-in trust and respectability," 99 spent
five or more years mediating before they finally broke even, let
alone made good money. 20 0 Furthermore, the fact that attorneys
select mediators has been suggested as one of the reasons why the
profession is not more diverse: most mediators are white males,
20 1
with legal training, in their fifties or older.
As the "winner-take-all" model predicts, attorneys will choose
from the short list for a number of reasons, but the primary ones are
that it saves them time and gives them the assurance that they are
buying a provider with a solid reputation. 20 2 Proposing a mediator
with national name recognition also makes it more likely that the
other side will agree to mediate. 20 3 As a result, the few mediators
who are the survivors have a steady flow of cases, while the rest
mediate for free or leave the profession.
2. Market Segmentation and Income Distribution
An additional barrier to entry is market segmentation and
specialization. 20 4 As the market for private mediation services
matures, it is becoming more specialized or segmented. Honeyman
et al. observe that it is not only difficult to enter the market for
20 5
private mediation services, but also to switch between markets.
Some of the most respected public policy mediators had essentially
no high-end commercial cases, even though they had a proven
"track record in work that is ...

at least as" complex. 20 6 Honeyman

et al. suggest that mediators are limited to markets in which they
have the requisite reputation, that is-as they suggest-in the
markets
where
they
can
demonstrate
authority
and
20 7
connectedness.
This finding is consistent with data for the
commercial mediation market, where attorneys select the
mediators, and only those with name recognition in the relevant
market will be on their short-list.
As a result, there are increasingly fewer opportunities for
KRMS & LUCKS, supra note 7, at 139.
See id. at 159-61.
201 Telephone Interview with Robert Benjamin, supra note 94. See also SEAMONE, supra
note 24, at § III. B.
202 See FRANK & COOK, supra note 98, at 37, 42-43, 93.
203 See E-mail from William Baten, supra note 140.
204 See Honeyman et. al, supra note 33, at 154.
205 See id.
206 See Honeyman et al., supra note 27, at 503-04.
207 See id. at 504.
199
200
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mediation generalists.
Aspirant mediators must thus have
experience in a particular subject matter-family disputes,
environmental work, business-in order to be able to succeed in the
market for private mediation services.
D. Elasticity of Demand: Fee Setting
Compared to litigation, mediation is cheap. 208 One commentator
estimates that it costs each party at least $100,000 "to litigate a
straightforward business claim. ' 20 9 Mediation of a similar dispute,
on the other hand, usually costs a fraction of that amount, and the
parties ordinarily share mediator fees. 210 Even high-end mediators
do not charge much more than $10,000 per day, and a
straightforward business claim usually takes a day to settle in
mediation. 211 As a result, most clients in high-end commercial
mediation cases are not price-sensitive, 2 12 and demand for
commercial mediation services is highly inelastic. One mediator
noted that mediator fees in high-value commercial disputes are
"inconsequential to the value of settling the matter," and hence
clients will pay for the mediator they want, not one they can
afford. 213
In domestic cases, mediator fees are usually lower overall, and
mediators tend to charge by the hour because clients are more pricesensitive. 214
Divorce mediation fees are also more commonly
regulated, either directly by legislation or court rules, or indirectly

208 See
The
Price
Is
Wrong!,
THE
MEDIATOR
MAG.,
http:/!
www.themediatormagazine.co.uk/features/10-survey/32-wrong (last visited Nov. 24, 2008)
(suggesting that mediator pricing is too low: since mediation is a "nascent market" where
information about the quality of services is difficult to obtain, prices have been kept too low).
209 See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the
JusticeSystem, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957 (2000).
210 See Cerveris, supra note 189. In addition to mediator fees, each party will usually pay
her own legal fees. Since an average mediation is completed within a day or two, even fees of
the highest paid attorneys are unlikely to exceed $10,000.
211 See Cerveris, supra note 146 (noting that the average mediation takes six hours).
212 Telephone Interview with Robert A. Creo, supra note 81.
213 Bickerman, supra note 99. While the relative low cost of mediation is relevant when
parties are deciding whether to mediate or litigate a particular dispute, it may be irrational to
consider the high cost of litigation when deciding between different mediators. After the
decision to mediate has been made, a conservative economist would predict that the decision
on which mediator to choose would be made by comparing prices of different mediators, and
not by considering the cost of litigation. Recent research in behavioral economics indicates,
however, that framing plays an important role in decision-making.
214 See Allen, supra note 187; E-mail from Susan Hammer, Mediator, to author (Mar. 20,
2008, 21:31:42 PST) (on file with author).
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by lower filing and legal fees for domestic disputes. 215 As a result,
demand is more elastic than in commercial mediation, and hence,
lower fees and hourly fees are more common in divorce mediation
2 16
than flat day fees.
Most paid mediation is billed to clients on an hourly basis. Most
court rosters that list mediator fees, list hourly fees, and some
markets, like Michigan, do not support per-day fees. 2 17 Hourly fees
vary by geography and by quality or reputation of the mediator.
Smaller markets, such as Virginia or Oregon, support lower fees. 2 18
In Virginia, low-end mediation services are available at under $50
21 9
per hour and the high-end of the market begins at $200 per hour.
Larger and more competitive mediation markets support higher
fees, often in excess of $500 per hour at the high end. 220
Only a minority of high-end commercial mediators in competitive
markets can charge flat per-diem fees or per case fees, 22' and even
fewer charge success fees. 22 2 The decision to charge per-diem fees
signals mediator's quality and reputation. Because it is difficult to
measure mediator quality by objective measures, other than
settlement rates, mediators use per-diem fees to signal quality, and
that they are in high demand. 22 3 Per-diem fees are used for two

See Bickerman, supra note 99.
See Allen, supra note 187.
217 Id. (noting that she charges per diem fees when she mediates out of state, but generally
not in-state).
218 See Virginia's Judicial System, Virginia Court Certified Mediators Search Results,
http://208.210.219.102/cgi-bin/mediation/search.cgi/g (last visited Nov. 24, 2008) (listing
hourly fee rates for various mediators). See, e.g., State of Oregon 161h Judicial District,
Mediation, http://www.ojd.state.or.us/dou/mediation.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2008) (stating
that the mediation costs $75 per hour, payable directly to the mediator).
219 See Virginia's Judicial System, supra note 218 (listing the customary hourly fees for
various mediators, including Susan W. Ballentine and Thomas E. Albro). In Oregon, highend mediators charge $400 per hour or more, and often charge flat per diem fees. See E-mail
from Susan Hammer, Mediator, to author (Apr. 6, 2008, 16:52:08 EST) (on file with author).
220 See, e.g., Bickerman, supra note 99; U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Resolution,
Pennsylvania,
Alternative
Dispute
http://coldfusion.pawd.uscourts.gov/adr/pages/ADRNeutralSearch.cfm (last visited Nov. 24,
2008).
221 Average per day fees range from $1,800-$3,500 in Texas to $4,000-$8,000 in California.
E-mail from Eric Galton, Mediator, to author (Mar. 28, 2008, 11:33:55 CST) (on file with
author). The very high end of the commercial mediation market command fees of $10,000 per
day, and the highest is $15,000 per day. See Baten, supra note 140.
222 Eric Green, for example, charges a success fee on top of the day fee for the most
"complex or other exceptional cases requiring extraordinary effort." Resolutions LLC, Rates,
Eric D. Green, http://www.resolutionsllc.comlrates.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2008).
223 See Cerveris, supra note 146. Mediators use those fees, whether or not they are in fact
in high demand. A number of mediators confirmed that although they are very successful,
they are constantly looking for business, and that the only reason they turn business away is
215
216
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additional reasons. First, mediators do not only want to charge
high fees, but they also want to be consistently busy. The best
mediators tend to not only charge the highest fees, but they are also
booked a few months in advance. 224 Per-diem fees with relatively
long cancellation periods enable these mediators to schedule
efficiently without gaps, and to be paid even if a party cancels or
reschedules the mediation. 225 Since mediation is a personal service
that cannot be delegated or postponed, mediators cannot schedule
more than one mediation at any given time. 226 Second, commercial
mediators charge per-diem fees instead of hourly fees so that they
can get paid before, or at, the mediation session and avoid collection
problems. 22 7 Since demand for large clients in high-stakes disputes
is relatively inelastic, top commercial mediators are able to charge
228
high per-diem fees, and have long cancellation periods.
Mediators who are unable to charge per-diem fees are faced with
the problems that cause mediators to charge such fees: they do not
get compensated for cancellations and often have more difficulty
with collection after the mediation. This makes entering the
profession more difficult and precarious, and many return to steady
paychecks because they cannot afford to wait until they have
229
acquired the necessary reputation to charge per-diem fees.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDIATION TRAINING

Mediation training programs have grown significantly over the
years. There exist the thirty-forty-hour basic mediation courses
that span a week and cost as much as $2,000;230 advanced programs
if they are already booked on that day.
224 "If I get to the point where my calendar is eighty percent booked for two months in
advance, I start to think about raising my rates. My experience is that a lot of high-end cases
need to be mediated within two months, so it doesn't pay to have your calendar completely
booked two months in advance or booked out over two months." Baten, supra note 140.
225 In particular, labor mediators whose fees are compressed, distinguish themselves by
longer cancellation fees. They generate a substantial amount of their revenue from
cancellation fees. For mediators who are lawyers, there are serious ethical concerns with
"double billing" their time.
226 See CREO, supra note 174, at 2.
227 See Galton, supra note 45.
228 See, e.g., KRIviS & LUCKS, supra note 7, at 143 (noting that top mediators, such as
Robert Creo, know that their time is valuable and therefore they can bill in advance for perdiem fees and be strict about cancellation fees).
229 See id. at 157-58.
230 See, e.g., Mediation Training Institute International, Mediator Certification,
http://www.mediationworks.com/medcert3/register.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2008) (listing the
cost of a regular forty-hour certification program at $2,495 or $1,995 if the candidate applies
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in family, housing, and civil mediation; 231 and, increasingly,
mediation course offerings at colleges and universities. 23 2 By 2003,
twenty-four law schools had provided dispute resolution
programs. 233 There now exist masters and Ph.D. programs in
dispute resolution. 2 34 Course offerings and an increasing number of
specialized dispute resolution journals indicate that there is indeed
a growing demand for dispute resolution education.235
As this article explains, while the mediation market has grown
and the need to be acquainted with mediation as a method of
dispute resolution has increased, opportunities to make a living as a
mediator remain scarce. Many people attend training programs or
obtain degrees in mediation expecting that there exist career
opportunities to match the skills for which they are being trained.
They get trained because they are hoping to make the career change
to mediation. 236 Many of the training programs include marketing
techniques in their curriculum, but few honestly describe the status
237
and availability of job opportunities in mediation.
The failure by mediation trainers to provide accurate information
about opportunities to make money in mediation contributes to
excess entry in the market for mediation services. As this article
explains, inaccurate information about the availability of mediation
jobs as well as over-optimism lead aspirant mediators to spend
money on mediation training and starting mediation practices, and
to incur opportunity costs by foregoing other career opportunities.
Not only may the failure of mediation trainers to fully disclose the
pros and cons of mediation practice and correct trainee
misapprehensions be unethical, 2 38 it also leads to socially inefficient
more than thirty days in advance).
231 See,
e.g.,
Mediation
Training
Group,
Inc.,
Registration,
http://mediationtraininggroup.comregistration.php (last visited Nov. 24, 2008) (listing the
different mediation training programs they offer); Mediation Works Incorporated, MWI's
Training Programs and Workshops, http://www.mwi.org/training/index.htm (last visited Nov.
24, 2008) (listing divorce and housing mediation as available training programs offered by
MWI).
232 See Sharon Press, Institutionalizationof Mediation in Florida:At the Crossroads, 108
PENN ST. L. REV. 43, 56-57 & n.94 (2003). See also MOSTEN, supra note 86, at 229-42 (listing

more than sixty schools that offer undergraduate and/or graduate degrees in alternative
dispute resolution).
233 See Press, supra note 232, at 56 n.94.
234

See MOSTEN, supra note 86, at 236-42.

235

See Press, supra note 232, at 56.
David Plimpton, Ethical Duties of Mediation Trainers in the Promotion of Training

236

Programs,24 SPIDR NEWS 1, 1 (2000).
237

See id. at 1, 3.

238 See id. at 3.
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outcomes. 239 To correct this misallocation of resources, mediation
training programs should disclose information about "the known
opportunities, limits, and obstacles in mediation employment and
professional practice opportunities."' 240
While it is true that
241 it
mediation may be a useful skill in our work and familial lives,
is likely that fewer people would spend hundreds or thousands of
dollars on mediation training without the expectation that training
24 2
could lead to a career change.
Course offerings at colleges, universities, and law schools, on the
other hand, are less problematic economically, because graduates
take them for reasons other than career change.
Often, law
students take mediation classes because they want to learn about a
method of dispute resolution that they expect to come across as
practicing attorneys, or simply because they want a class that is
different. Furthermore, students of mediation rarely expect to work
as mediators after they graduate, and are better able to learn about
the market for mediation services over the course of the semester as
they take the course than someone who signs up for a forty-hour
crash course. Offices of career services will also soon put an end to
any serious misconceptions about mediation careers.
Finally,
243
mediation courses legitimize mediation and give it credibility.
Assuming that mediation is overall more cost-effective than
litigation, it is socially efficient to spread common knowledge about
its benefits, and perhaps provide universal mediation training in
schools and in workplaces. 244 But, as the section explains, it is
socially inefficient to charge large sums of money on the pretense
that mediation is a viable career option for a large number of
people.

See analysis of excess entry, supra Part 1II.A., at 121-22.
Plimpton, supra note 236, at 4.
241 There are an increasing number of attorneys who get trained in mediation without the
aspiration of becoming mediators. One Boston law firm, for example, hired a group of
mediators to train them, even though only one or two of the attorneys had aspirations of
providing mediation services. The reason the firm paid for mediation training is to enable
their attorneys to better understand the practice and provide better legal advice to their
clients. I thank David Hoffman for this observation.
242 See Plimpton, supranote 236, at 4.
243 See id.
244 See David A. Hoffman, The Future of ADR Practice: Three Hopes, Three Fears, and
Three Predictions,22 NEGOTIATION J. 467, 469-69 (2006).
239
240
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VI. CONCLUSION

Mediation has grown tremendously in the last three decades, yet
only a small number of mediators have been able to benefit
financially from its growth. The supply of willing mediators by far
exceeds the demand for their services. Mediator trainee overoptimism and the lack of formal barriers to entry result in excess
entry in the market for mediators. However, the lack of a formal
barrier, but the existence of de facto barriers to entry, such as
mediator selection practices and specialization, combined with
excessive individual optimism, creates inefficiently high levels of
entry. This is socially suboptimal: many aspirant mediators spend
money pursuing what is likely an illusory career and forego other
career options, even though they were never going to be able to
make money as mediators.
This article presents data showing that income distribution in the
market for private mediation is uneven, and suggests that the
market is a winner-take-all market, where a few mediators at the
top of the pyramid are busy and well-paid, while the vast majority
of aspiring mediators is constantly looking for work, yet makes little
or no money. This article proposes economic reasons that contribute
to this phenomenon: non-homogeneity of the product (i.e., mediation
services); de facto barriers to entry, including mediator selection
preferences and specialization; organizational structures; and
inelastic demand for mediator services. Since mediation consumers
often compare the cost of mediation to the cost of litigation instead
of comparing costs of different mediators, new mediators are unable
to compete for work on price.
Information problems, in particular the lack of objective measures
of mediator quality, other than settlement rates, and attorneys'
control of access to clients, have made reputation the most
important factor for mediator selection, making it difficult for new
entrants to gain a foothold in the private mediation market. Small
firm size further reduces the number of opportunities for new
mediators to learn skills and acquire the necessary reputation to be
able to practice on their own.
Since experience and reputation are essential for success, only
celebrity mediators, mediators with authority-such as former
judges-and those with sufficient resources and stamina are able to
survive in the market long enough to make a living as mediators.
As a result, mediation is a second or third career for virtually all
full-time mediators in private practice.
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This has important implications for aspirant mediators and for
the design of mediation training programs. Aspirant mediators
would be well-advised to specialize in a particular field, such as
environmental issues or construction, and gain a solid reputation
among lawyers and/or business people in that field before starting a
mediation career. In addition, mediation training programs ought
to be redesigned to convey to aspirant mediators the realities of
mediation practice.

